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Summary
Livestock producers are coming in for increasing criticism world-wide on the grounds that
livestock production is bad for the environment. Mention ’cattle’ and ’developing countries’ in
the same breath, and many will immediately think of overgrazing, desertification, and
deforestation. But the environmental consequences of livestock production vary widely,
depending on the opportunities and constraints afforded by different production systems,
institutional and policy contexts. Focusing principally on pastoral grazing systems and
integrated crop-livestock systems, this paper examines the less widely documented case that
there are also positive environmental externalities associated with livestock production.
Livestock production can play an instrumental role, for example, in supporting sustainable
rangeland management, preserving wildlife and other forms of biodiversity, enhancing soil
fertility and nutrient cycling, and in directly promoting the amenity value of particular
landscapes to other users.
The environments in which most pastoral grazing systems and integrated crop-livestock
systems are to be found are characterised by multiple uses and multiple users, all with
legitimate claims on environmental goods and services, but not all of which can be
compatible all of the time. The paper addresses ways of enhancing, through policy
instruments, the sharing of environmental benefits between multiple users of the environment
including livestock producers. It argues that the task of policy makers should be to expose
these multiple, contested claims on the environment, to make explicit the political choices
involved in the design of benefit-sharing mechanisms, and to seek out those that offer most
promise of ’win-win’ or at least ’win-no regret’ solutions.
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1INTRODUCTION
More than half of the world’s land surface is used for livestock production, encompassing
landscapes of extraordinary natural beauty and of global importance to the biosphere. The
environmental consequences of livestock production vary widely, depending on the
opportunities and constraints afforded by different production systems, institutional and
policy contexts. But it is now increasingly recognised that such environments are
characterised by multiple uses and multiple users, all with legitimate claims on goods and
services derived from the environment. These claims cannot be compatible with one another
all of the time, and relationships among competing claimants can at times become highly
conflictual. The notion of ’benefit sharing’ is here understood to refer to the fact that goods
and services derived from the environment provide benefits to a wide range of potential users,
among them livestock producers, which need to be balanced. But since balancing contested
claims is inherently a political act, the ’appropriate’ distribution of environmental benefits
among users cannot be defined objectively. The task of policy analysts must be to expose
these multiple, contested claims on environmental goods and services; to make explicit the
political choices involved in the design of instruments and mechanisms for benefit sharing;
and to seek out those that offer most promise of ’win-win’ or at least ’win-no regret’ solutions.
MARKET FAILURE IN DISTRIBUTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS
The prices paid for livestock products world-wide fail to reflect fully the environmental costs
associated with their production. Government subsidies of various kinds, whether for animal
feed, for land clearance, or for fossil fuel energy used in industrial livestock rearing, and tariff
barriers to trade in livestock products, yet further distort market prices and exacerbate the
environmental costs of livestock produced under certain conditions. The consequences are
well documented:
Rings of barren earth spread out from wells on the grasslands of [former] Soviet
Turkmenia. Heather and lilies wilt in the nature preserves of the southern Netherlands.
Forests teeming with rare forms of plant and animal life explode in flame in Costa
Rica. Water tables fall and fossil fuels are wasted in the United States. Each of these
cases of environmental decline issues from a single source: the global livestock
industry. (Durning and Brough 1991: 5)
It is less widely appreciated, however, that there are also positive environmental externalities
associated with livestock production, which go equally unaccounted in market prices for
livestock products. In a wide range of livestock production systems, from pastoral grazing
systems to integrated crop-livestock systems, livestock production confers certain
environmental benefits which are not well captured by the market mechanism. In some cases
the underlying causal processes are not well understood by policy makers and, as a result,
livestock producers are wrongly castigated for environmental problems that could be avoided
with more appropriate institutional, pricing and policy arrangements. It is the purpose of this
paper to elaborate on some of the positive environmental externalities associated with
livestock production, and to suggest ways that these benefits may be enhanced through policy
instruments and shared with other claimants on environmental goods and services.
2A narrow view of the economy considers only the direct, marketed flows of goods and
services from economic production to consumption, and the return flow of labour to
economic production. It ignores the underlying natural resource stocks and flows and
ecological functioning services which sustain economic production and human well-being.
While livestock production generates outputs such as meat, milk, skins and hides, fuel energy
and draught power, on this wider view it also entails many positive externalities including
landscape, environmental and species amenity values, waste assimilation, and ecological
functions such as nutrient cycling and the maintenance of certain conditionally-renewable
resource stocks.
Placing values on these positive environmental externalities allows for a sounder analysis of
the economic benefits, as well as costs, of livestock production:
Total economic value = direct use value (e.g. livestock products, landscape amenity)
+ ecological function value (e.g. nutrient cycling, favouring seed
germination)
+ option value (e.g. animal genetic diversity)
+ existence value (e.g. satisfaction that domesticated herbivores are
there)
Efficient and sustainable resource pricing follows both the polluter (user)-pays principle and
the beneficiary-compensates principle (Young 1992). The latter recognises that livestock
production can provide positive environmental benefits and even increase future options,
including actions that improve or maintain landscape and biodiversity values and provide
environmental services. On this principle, if livestock producers perform additional actions
(including forgoing production) to help to maintain highly valued landscapes as diverse as
alpine meadows, the Hell’s Canyon in Oregon3, and African savannas, they should be
compensated by the recreational beneficiaries for the ongoing costs of landscape maintenance
that do not bring market benefits and are not required of all people.
For example, the opportunity cost of wildlife biodiversity conservation in protected areas of
Kenya, measured in terms of forgone livestock and agricultural production, has been
estimated to be around $203 mn/yr, or 2.8 per cent of total GDP, while revenues from
wildlife tourism and forestry contribute only around $42 mn/yr to the national economy
(Norton-Griffiths and Southey 1995). The authors argue that, given the global nature of the
benefits of Kenya’s conservation efforts, it is quite inappropriate that so much of the cost is
borne by Kenya alone. It will be argued below that wildlife conservation and livestock
production are potentially more complementary than this case suggests, but the point remains
that the amenity and option values of biodiversity should be fully reflected in the prices paid
by those who make use of these benefits, and should be used to compensate those who bear
the additional costs of providing them.
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3Types and overall significance of livestock production systems
Grazing systems are based almost exclusively on livestock kept on rangelands (i.e.
unimproved grasslands, shrublands, savannas, deserts and tundra), with no or only limited
integration with crops and relying little on imported inputs (Steinfeld et al. 1996). Of all
livestock production systems, grazing systems are the most likely to coincide geographically
with areas of high value for wildlife and other forms of biodiversity. Rangelands occupy 51
per cent of the earth’s land surface (almost 90 per cent of agricultural land in Africa, West and
Central Asia, and Latin America, and over 60 per cent of agricultural land elsewhere in Asia),
contain about 36 per cent of its total carbon in living and dead biomass, include a large
number of economically important species and ecotypes, support 50 per cent of the world’s
livestock4, and sustain the livelihoods of millions of people (25 million in Africa alone) who
would otherwise have to make a living outside the rangelands at arguably greater net cost to
the environment.
Grazing systems are usually geared to the production of multiple outputs, including meat,
milk, blood, hides and skins, dung fuel, transportation, flexible household capital reserves
and risk management, although ranching systems are generally geared more narrowly towards
meat production. Many of these outputs are untraded and markets fail to capture even their
direct use values, let alone the broader environmental benefits. Table 2 summarises the
findings of a number of studies comparing returns to ranching (single output systems) and
pastoral production (multiple outputs) in Africa, and shows that pastoral production
consistently outperforms ranching on a per hectare basis. While pure grazing systems may
produce only 9 per cent of world meat and 8 per cent of world milk production (Steinfeld et
al.1996), their value in providing multiple direct outputs and additional indirect benefits, such
as the preservation of landscape amenity and wildlife biodiversity, justifies continued efforts
to specify accurately the nature of livestock-environment interactions within them.
Crop-livestock integration is the main avenue for intensification in more humid and sub-
humid regions where external inputs are not available, and can support higher rural
populations than grazing systems alone. Integrated crop-livestock systems can be
environmentally beneficial, as by-products from one production component (e.g. crop
residues, manure) serve as inputs to other components. Livestock play a key role in energy
and nutrient cycling, as well as providing a diverse range of outputs (McDowell 1977), and
rotations of crops with forage legumes replenishes soil nutrients and reduces soil erosion.
Even considering direct use values alone, the estimated contribution of livestock to
agricultural GDP in Africa, including manure and draught power, may be as high as 35 per
cent (Winrock 1992).
Crop-livestock integration may take place at a range of scales, from a single farm unit to an
entire region. ’Mixed farming’ usually refers to integration within a single farm unit (Winrock
1992), but it is useful to consider farmer-herder interactions on an intra-regional scale under
the same general heading, as such interactions have certain advantages over mixed farming,
especially in relation to equity and the efficient use of skilled labour (Bayer and Waters-Bayer
1995). While integrated crop-livestock production is the most prevalent form of livestock
production system in much of Asia, in Africa it has usually occurred as a process of factor
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4and input substitution, induced largely by population growth (McIntire et al. 1992, Tiffen et
al. 1994).
Industrial systems  Further intensification generally implies the import of external inputs
which can bring to an end the beneficial equilibrium between livestock and the environment.
Manure, for example, while of primary importance in integrated crop-livestock systems, can
in excessive quantities become a harmful pathogen. Industrial systems tend to be geared to
the production of single rather than multiple outputs, and which are usually traded on
markets. The fastest growing sector of the global livestock industry is poultry production,
which increased by 48% between 1984 and 1994, compared with a 3-6 per cent increase for
the principal ruminant animals (see table 1).
The principal focus of this paper is on grazing and integrated crop-livestock systems, since it
is in these systems that benefit-sharing between livestock production and the environment is
most prevalent and offers most potential for enhancement through policy intervention. Given
the space constraint, rather than attempt to give a comprehensive overview the paper will
highlight those issues which seem to be most frequently misrepresented and which offer
substantial scope for benefit sharing through innovative institutional and policy initiatives.
Some successful examples of benefit sharing of environmental goods and services are given
as text boxes throughout the paper. In industrial systems the relevant policy options are more
a question of damage-limitation or reducing the environmental costs associated with livestock
production (Young 1996). These issues fall outside the scope of the present discussion.
ENVIRONMENTAL GOODS AND SERVICES APPROPRIATE FOR BENEFIT
SHARING
This section defines the main types of environmental goods and services appropriate for
benefit sharing. First we consider those environmental services provided by livestock
production which have ecological function values, including the maintenance of terrestrial
ecosystems (supporting rangeland productivity, nutrient cycling and soil fertility
enhancement, and carbon sequestration), and the preservation of wildlife and other forms of
biodiversity. Next are those environmental goods and services which yield direct use values
to society, and which livestock production helps provide. These include landscape amenity,
weeding services, draught animal power and livestock-derived energy sources. In the case of
draught power and household energy supply from livestock, additional environmental
benefits derive from the fact that they carry lower opportunity costs in terms of net
greenhouse gas emissions, compared with alternative (fossil-fuel based) means of supplying
the same services. Finally, we consider livestock-related environmental goods that have
option values, especially animal genetic resources.
Ecological function values
Sustainable rangeland management: Conventional wisdom suggests that much of the blame
for ’desertification’ and land degradation in arid rangelands rests with pastoral livestock
production. There is now a considerable literature which corrects this misconception, on two
counts: (i) the extent of dryland degradation is greatly exaggerated, because the underlying
5ecological dynamics have been misunderstood5 (Behnke et al. 1993, Swift 1996); and (ii) the
contributory role of livestock has also been misspecified (e.g. Sandford 1983, Homewood and
Rodgers 1987, Behnke 1994). If desertification is understood as irreversible degradation, then
a far smaller proportion of arid rangelands are thus affected. Dryland ecosystems are now
understood to be:
• highly variable over time, heterogeneous in space, and resilient; in which
• long-run primary productivity is influenced more by abiotic factors such as rainfall than
by the density of grazing livestock within the system; and
• the flexibility of opportunistic or ’tracking’ strategies of mobile animals, along with many
other adaptations herders and farmers make to the vagaries of such dynamic, event-driven
ecosystems, allows the exploitation of the varied phenology, production dynamics and
forage quality of diverse feed sources.
These factors make possible continued human habitation of ’marginal’, variable dryland
environments such as the Sahel. They also permit the integration of several production
systems on a regional basis, each of which would be unviable on its own, as in the case of the
Inland Niger Delta (Moorehead 1991). Therefore, under the right conditions, production
systems relying on mobile livestock represent the most sustainable way to utilise arid
rangelands (see Box 1), and can and ought to be supported and enhanced through policy
intervention designed to give greater decision-making power to local producer groups
(Scoones 1995). These issues are addressed in more detail in the sections below.
A wealth of evidence exists to support the view that light or moderate grazing by livestock
increases rangeland productivity in many grazing systems. For example, removal of coarse,
dead stems permits succulent new shoots in species such as Themeda triandra in African
savannas. The seeds of some plant species are spread efficiently by being carried in cattle
guts, then deposited in dung in favourable seed beds or trampled into the soil. The passage of
herbage through the gut and out as faeces modifies the nitrogen cycle, so that grazed pastures
tend to be richer in nitrogen than ungrazed ones. The recruitment of tree species is also
favoured under certain conditions by grazing animals. Reid and Ellis (1995) found that goats
play a key role in enhancing recruitment reliability of the important Acacia tortilis tree in
South Turkana, Kenya. Similarly, in nature reserves along South Africa’s Eastern Cape,
recruitment of certain rare tree and shrub species including cycad and the endemic Pondoland
palm, which are regarded as an important justification for nature conservation in the area,
appears to be favoured in former homestead sites where livestock corrals have concentrated
nutrients6. Goats have been found to play an important role in the maintenance of Arizona
chaparral by reducing brush cover (Severson and Debano 1991), and in controlling the
noxious weed leafy spurge throughout the western US, thereby enhancing biodiversity and
landscape amenity. Indeed, the removal of grazing pressure owing to forced abandonment of
                    
5
 The science of dryland degradation has in fact been well understood for several decades, such as the fact that
large inter-annual shifts in desert margins and in biomass production can be explained by variations in rainfall.
Swift (1996) argues that the persistence of the concept of ’desertification’ in the face of mounting evidence that it
is inaccurate, and the perpetuation of policies which rest on the view that pastoral livestock production is largely
to blame, have less to do with science than with the competing claims of different political and bureaucratic
constituencies.
6
 Thembela Kepe, personal communication (1996) in connection with research in progress under the
’Environmental Entitlements’ project, Institute of Development Studies, UK, and University of the Western
Cape, South Africa.
6grazing land in areas of endemic armed conflict, such as Turkana district of Kenya and the
areas which border it, can itself lead to undesirable landscape changes in the form of dense
thorny scrub invasion (Conant 1982, Hendrickson et al. 1996). The potential
complementarities between landscape amenity, wildlife biodiversity and grazing livestock
production are discussed separately below.
Box 1 The effectiveness of pastoral land management practices: lessons from Central
Ferlo, Senegal
Preservation of wildlife biodiversity  The relationships between wild and domestic ungulates
co-existing in the same habitats are complex, and turn on the questions of the extent of
dietary overlap and competition for forage, and of disease vectors. For example, domestic
sheep are acknowledged to be carriers of disease which threaten populations of wild Bighorn
sheep in western USA. But these relationships are by no means always competitive. Many
recent studies point to the potential for complementarity and even symbiosis between wild
and domestic ungulates, especially in relation to foraging patterns. Domestic as well as wild
ungulates are an integral component of co-evolved dryland ecosystems many regions of the
world (e.g. Homewood and Rodgers (1987) and Little (1996) for East Africa; Hoffman et al.
(1996) for the South African karoo; Perevolotsky (1995) for the Negev, Israel; Sheehy (1995)
for Mongolia and China; and West (1993), Sheehy and Vavra (1995), and Hobbs et al. (1996)
for western USA, to cite but a few studies). Failure to recognise these potential
From the early 1980s, GTZ experimented with a new method of pastoral resource management around the Widou
Thiengoli borehole in Central Ferlo, Senegal. The new management model was based on the principle of sustaining
balance between available pasture and stocking rates within a fixed territory, privatised for the purpose of the
experiment. The system was monitored continuously for 12 years for its environmental and socio-economic impacts.
The controlled grazing experiment enclosed an area of around 1,500 ha into six 200 ha plots, together with 200 ha set
aside for regeneration and 100 ha for livestock routes. Plots were managed according to different, but moderate,
stocking densities so as to test several scenarios, and were compared with herds outside the scheme on common grazing
land. In order to maintain constant stocking density, control herds inside the scheme were to receive supplements in the
event of a fodder deficit.
Several problems emerged from the monitoring studies. First, the period 1981-92 was characterised by extreme
variability in rainfall and therefore plant biomass production. The constant stocking density proved to be incompatible
with the wide variations in available forage. In bad years, stocking densities were too high and herds had to be moved
out to survive. Available forage was insufficient in 3 years but under-utilised in 4 years out of the 12. Only in 2 years
did stocking density and carrying capacity actually match up. Second, the impact on grazing resources was more
negative than positive, owing to under-utilisation, a decline in quality of pasture, and a thinning out of drought-resistant
fodder species. Controlled grazing also failed significantly to improve ligneous vegetation cover. Third, while animal
production effects were good in good years, animal vulnerability increased in bad years. For a range of socio-economic
reasons as well, it was concluded by GTZ that controlled grazing under these conditions was unviable.
Comparisons with pastoral management practices outside the scheme revealed the superiority of the latter, owing to the
inherent limitations of the concept of carrying capacity in an environment not at equilibrium; the difficulties of applying
a closed model of water and grazing management on a large scale; the reduction in animal mobility and flexibility which
resulted; and the removal of the positive, symbiotic interaction of animals and plant communities. GTZ concluded that
efforts to support pastoralists’ self-reliance would have to depend much more on the creation of a favourable
institutional environment, including securing pastoral land rights and access to fall-back areas.
Source: Thébaud, Grell and Miehe (1995)
7complementarities has led to missed policy opportunities for achieving benefit sharing
between livestock and environment (see Box 2). The presumption that livestock are
necessarily inimical to the conservation of wildlife biodiversity has led to policies favouring
wildlife over pastoralists, with consequences that perversely harm the environment as well as
livestock producers and national economies (McCabe et al. 1992, Norton-Griffiths and
Southey 1995).
The state-of-science in biodiversity conservation is now shifting from protection for
’charismatic’ species to defensively managing larger tracts of land with habitats or ecosystems
holding suites of sensitive species (West 1993, Perrings et al. 1995). It is increasingly
acknowledged that moderate livestock grazing will actually increase the chances of survival
of some species, and can enhance community- and landscape-level diversity in many
instances (West 1993).
Box 2 Complementarity of wild and domestic herbivores in environments of high
amenity value
Soil fertility enhancement/ nutrient cycling  In integrated crop-livestock systems, benefits are
shared between livestock production and other uses of the environment in terms of soil
fertility enhancement and nutrient cycling, whether on-farm, intra-village, or intra-region
(Bayer and Waters-Bayer 1995). Pastures and fodder fields suffer less soil erosion and absorb
more water than row-crop fields, and leguminous fodder plants such as alfalfa also improve
soil fertility. Manure from livestock (pigs and ruminants together) may contribute as much as
35 per cent of soil organic matter (Steinfeld et al. 1996), helps maintain soil structure, water
retention and drainage capacity. The value of manure is so well recognised that many farmers
keep livestock primarily for this purpose. Feeding crop residues to livestock is also the best
way to utilise ’waste’ products, as nutrient uptake is achieved more efficiently than if stalks
were added directly to the soil, and burning would increase CO2 emissions.
In western USA, demographic and political forces increasingly favour recreational uses over livestock production in
landscapes of high amenity value, owing to the relatively greater lobbying strength of an increasingly urbanised electorate.
But these demographics are not shared in much of the developing world, and here the distribution of environmental costs
and benefits takes on a North-South dimension.
It has been argued that the current antipathy between livestock producers and environmental lobbying groups in western
USA has led to missed opportunities in forging alliances against uncontrolled residential and urban development which
has far worse environmental impacts than even the worst excesses of livestock production. The adversarial relationship
between livestock producers and environmentalists in the US has a disproportionate effect in other parts of the world as
well. Development policy options in places as far afield as Mongolia are being unnecessarily restricted, based on the
misconception that relations between wild and domestic herbivores are invariably competitive.
Recent research in northeastern Oregon, however, shows that cattle grazing improves the quality of seasonal rangeland
forage available to elk during critical periods of nutritional stress. The removal of cattle from publicly managed seasonal
rangeland in response to concerns over endangered wildlife species may in fact cause elk to concentrate foraging activities
on whatever seasonal rangeland continues to be grazed by cattle: namely, privately owned land which often contains
stream and riparian habitat important to valued species of fish and wildlife such as the Chinook and Snake River salmon.
Similar findings regarding the potential complementarity and even symbiosis of wild and domestic herbivores have been
made for North American sagebrush grasslands, and for similar environments in Mongolia.
Sources: Daniels (1996), Sheehy (1995), Sheehy and Vavra (1995), Hobbs et al. (1996), Huntsinger and Hopkinson
(1996), Jackson (1992)
8With growing population densities, farmers in semi-arid areas such as the Sahelian and
Sudanian belts of West Africa face rising transaction costs in obtaining manure (Toulmin
1992). This raises the question, why not move to mixed farming rather than rely on feed-
manure exchanges between farmers and herders, and thereby internalise those transaction
costs? Bayer and Waters-Bayer (1995) suggest that one reason farmer-herder exchanges
continue to be preferred is on grounds of equity and efficiency in the use of skilled labour;
this finding is supported by Delgado (1978) on grounds of the high opportunity cost of
seasonal labour in farming.
While crop-livestock interaction can at best maintain nutrient balance, positive trends are also
possible, including shifting from cattle to sheep and goats, and introducing stall feeding,
which significantly increases the amount of nutrients available from manure (see Box 3). The
cultivation of legume fodders and trees, for example, in alley farming systems, also
contributes to soil enrichment through nitrogen fixation (see Box 4). In Colombia and
Vietnam, where sugar cane is used as livestock feed, it has been shown that the recycling of
dead leaves into the soil, instead of burning them, favours nitrogen fixation by bacteria and
reduces weed growth, thus increasing crop yields (Sansoucy 1995).
Box 3 Introduction of stall feeding of livestock in watershed management projects,
Rajasthan, India
In the Aravalli Hills of Udaipur district, southeastern Rajasthan, a wide variety of watershed management projects have
been introduced by governmental and non-governmental agencies in order to improve ground vegetation cover, improve
soil and moisture conservation, and improve farming livelihoods. Livestock play an important role in local production
systems, particularly as a source of organic fertiliser, for draught power, and for milk. A few cattle or buffaloes and
small ruminants are kept by farmers of most castes, including oxen if they are better-off, but larger herds of goats and
sheep, and camels, are kept by scheduled castes and tribes such as Gairi, Rebari, and Dangi. Some of the watershed
development projects have enclosed areas of common grazing on hillsides, and have treated the enclosed areas with soil
and water conservation bunds, tree planting, live fencing, and maintain social controls to keep livestock out. Very little
common grazing remains.
Stall-feeding of animals has become commonplace, and for most families with relatively few livestock, cutting and
carrying fodder from their own fields, those of others, or from the enclosures (which are opened for this purpose on a
few days each year), is sufficient to meet livestock feed requirements. These farmers carry manure to their fields, and
mix it with crop residues and household wastes in compost heaps before applying it to the soil. They claim crop yields
have increased significantly following the introduction of these techniques. Those who rely relatively more on livestock
have lost out however. They can graze their animals only along roadsides or on the few the degraded areas of still
common access grazing land. Manure-for-feed exchanges are so far only in their infancy, but may provide promise for
the future for the livestock keepers.
9Box 4 Agroforestry options agropastoral and dairy production
Carbon sequestration  It is very difficult to make generalisations about the role of livestock
production systems in contributing to global warming via carbon emissions. While livestock
grazing is responsible for removing herbaceaous and woody biomass, an inverse relationship
is also commonly observed between the extent and frequency of fires and livestock density.
That is, greater livestock density reduces biomass removal by fires, thereby increasing
available herbage and reducing relative removal rates by livestock (de Leeuw and Reid 1995).
For all of Africa in 1993, land use change resulted in an estimated 730 million tonnes of CO2
emissions, of which only 9 million tonnes net, or just over 1 per cent, was contributed by
livestock production (World Bank African Development Indicators, 1996, Table 14.15).
Although the relationships are complex are difficult to generalise, many micro-studies, such
as one in the Netherlands (Vandasselaarn and Lantinga 1995), show higher soil carbon
fixation under livestock grazing by comparison with other management regimes. The
terrestrial stock of carbon, however, is highly uncertain, and has been hypothesised as a
possible site for a ’missing’ carbon sink, in which the maintenance of savanna ecosystems may
play an especially important role. What is known however, is that various technological
options do exist for inducing incentive-compatible forms of land use change under livestock
production, as ways to achieve higher standing biomass cover and therefore net carbon
storage. These options include efforts to slow rates of land clearance for agriculture, and to
increase production of perennial fodder crops and trees in farming systems (G. Leach and
Mearns 1988, Swallow 1995).
Direct use values
Landscape amenity  Many of the world’s highly valued grassland landscapes, e.g. North
American prairies, Argentinian pampas, East African savannas, Mongolian steppes, and
alpine meadows, have long been grazed by domesticated as well as wild herbivores. Cattle,
sheep, goats and other ungulates appear to have been first domesticated around 9,000 to
11,000 years ago, and 6,000 to 8,000 years ago people began taking herds onto savanna
landscapes in Africa (Lamprey 1983, cited in Young and Solbrig 1992: 15). They are co-
evolved landscapes, and grazing livestock play an integral role in their maintenance (West
1993). They are also anthropogenic landscapes (Spooner and Mann 1982, Adams and
In the agropastoral area of Konso, southern Ethiopia, a tree-planting programme began with Norwegian support in the
late 1970s with the aim of reducing soil erosion and providing building poles and fuelwood. These were not the felt
needs of local people, however, and the project shifted its focus towards trees that could provide fodder for livestock.
While conflicts over grazing were common initially, in time, local communities proposed more suitable planting sites
and took initiatives to protect tree seedlings from grazing livestock. They also began to plant Terminalis brownii, an
indigenous agroforestry species which coppices easily, and the leaves of which provide valuable fodder, especially for
stall-fed sheep.
In Kilifi district on the Kenyan coast, a local energy research station developed an alley-cropping package as a solution
to the problem of low and declining soil fertility, comprising leguminous trees grown in parallel lines with food crops.
On leaving the research station, local farmers modified the package substantially as the Leucaena trees were valued far
more as a source of animal fodder. Farmers felt benefits in terms of higher cash incomes from the sale of milk, and
higher crop yields from the application of manure. Leucaena fodder significantly helped to bridge the dry-season fodder
deficit.
Source: Leach and Mearns (1988)
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McShane 1992, Leach and Mearns 1996), and many people place both direct use and option
values on their preservation, including such human artifacts linked to livestock production as
dry-stone walls in the British Pennines and traditional hay stooks in the Austrian Tyrol.
Within Europe, benefit sharing mechanisms have been addressed explicitly, and income
support payments are made to farmers in the interests of landscape preservation. Payments are
made through the European Community, for example, to compensate farmers in designated
Environmentally Sensitive (or Stewardship) Areas for grazing extensification with the aim of
restoring vegetation species diversity (cf. Bullock 1996). In southern England, public nature
trusts themselves own flocks of sheep used in the management of chalk downlands, as
selective grazing is the only known way to maintain vegetation species richness in these
fragile landscapes.
Draught animal power  Some 52 per cent of the cultivated area in developing countries
(excluding China) is farmed using only draught animals. Compared with the use of tractors,
animal power is a renewable energy source, is produced on-farm with almost all of the
required implements made locally, with far lower opportunity costs in terms of greenhouse
gas emissions from fossil-fuel burning, and with additional environmental benefits of nutrient
cycling (Sansoucy 1995, Singh et al. 1995). It has also been argued that animal traction can
have positive gender impacts (Hofs et al. 1993). Unlike in much of Asia, efforts to introduce
animal traction in Africa have been disappointing, given the relative opportunity costs to
farmers of land, labour and capital (McIntire et al 1992). Even in many parts of Africa,
however, the conditions for adoption of animal traction, including rising population density
and introduction of high value-added cash crops and market accessibility, have been present
(Delgado 1989, Tiffen et al. 1994), and that even the high initial capital investment costs
(Panin and de Haen 1989) can be overcome.
Household energy supply  In many countries, animal dung is a preferred cooking fuel, either
year-round, seasonally, or for particular types of cooking. It is the major source of household
energy for millions of people in Asia, Africa, parts of the Near East and Latin America. It is
often argued that burning dung as fuel carries a very high opportunity cost in terms of ’lost’
soil nutrients. One study using replacement cost valuation techniques, for example, estimated
this opportunity cost to be as much as 9 per cent of Ethiopia’s GNP in 1983 (Newcombe
1989, cited in Pearce and Warford 1993: 25). This is almost certainly a gross exaggeration,
based on the fallacy that using dung as fuel is necessarily diversionary. As other studies show,
however, the use of dung as fuel is rarely a recent phenomenon, and may always have been
practised in particular localities without any ’diversion’ of soil nutrients (G. Leach and Mearns
1988). Indeed, the case is usually made in order to justify large-scale afforestation projects,
which frequently carry heavy costs in terms of lost grazing for livestock.
Biogas production from animal manure has also been successfully adopted by millions of
farmers in developing countries as a source of household energy substituting for fossil fuel or
fuelwood. About 25 million people use it in China alone (Sansoucy 1995). Effluent from
biodigesters can also be recycled as fertiliser, with even better results than the original
manure, or as fish feed in aquaculture systems, and can provide additional services such as
lighting, warm water, water-pumping and heating. All of these applications substitute for
energy sources with arguably higher environmental costs in terms of greenhouse gas
emissions.
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Weeding services  Livestock, especially sheep, are also efficient in controlling weeds, with
environmental benefits in terms of landscape amenity value and biodiversity as well as
economic benefits in higher crop yields. Sheep weeded American corn fields before the
Second World War, for example, and ducks and geese still control weeds on Southeast Asian
farms (Baker et al. 1990). Livestock graze beneath trees in rubber and oil-palm plantations in
Malaysia, and increase overall production while reducing the cost of weed control (using less
environmentally methods) by up to 40 per cent (Sansoucy 1995). It is common to use
livestock grazing as a means to reduce fire hazards in forests, or accidental burning at an
inappropriate time in burning management regimes for livestock production in areas as
diverse as those in the Mediterranean, British moorlands, and South Africa.
Option values
Animal genetic resources  The four principal mammalian livestock species (cattle, sheep,
goats, pigs) have diversified under more than 5,000 years of domestication and artificial
selection into more than 2,000 recognised breeds, each with unique characteristics (see table
1). Intensification of production has gone hand in hand with a narrowing of the genetic base,
especially among cattle and pigs. But it is now recognised that the pool of genetic resources
represented by domestic animal diversity is an essential basis for global food security, and is
likely to be of increasing importance in more demanding production environments.
Traditional breeding practices tend to select for survival under conditions of stress such as
extreme cold and seasonal feed deficits (see e.g. FAO 1991 for the Mongolia case), unlike
conventional breeding which selects for meat or milk productivity under controlled, high-
input conditions. In arid, drought-prone rangelands, low-input animals such as zebu cattle are
physiological adapted to ’track’ available feed and water supply by shifting their metabolic
rate by season and between years, thus permitting optimum exploitation of highly variable
environments (Western and Finch 1986, Bayer and Waters-Bayer 1995). However, attempts
to introduce high-productivity, exotic breeds into low-input, high-stress environments has
often been to the detriment of locally adapted and highly variable animal genetic resources -
precisely the qualities required to further develop and sustain production in otherwise
inhospitable environments. FAO conservatively suggests that one in four breeds is now
threatened with extinction (Hammond and Leitch 1995).
This section has reviewed the environmental goods and services appropriate for benefit
sharing between livestock production and other legitimate resource claimants, including
future generations whose preferences cannot yet be known. It is clear that livestock can, under
the right conditions, be good for the environment. But not all of these benefits can be
maximised all of the time for all users. The environment in grazing and crop-livestock
production systems is above all characterised by multiple uses and multiple users. This poses
significant analytical challenges, but advances have been made recently in understanding how
better to account for benefit-sharing, and how to translate analytical insights into policy
recommendations, as the following section discusses.
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INSTRUMENTS AND MECHANISMS OF BENEFIT SHARING
This section addresses the institutional instruments and mechanisms for bringing about
benefit-sharing, with a particular focus on co-management, and decentralisation of decision-
making according to the principle of ’subsidiarity’, or ensuring that management decisions are
taken by the appropriate stakeholders at the appropriate scale level. The discussion
necessarily touches on issues of local participation in benefit sharing, including the
specification of benefits to be shared, equity, the role of government, and the advantages and
disadvantages of decentralisation.
The general underlying argument here is, first, since livestock production already yields many
significant environmental benefits under certain conditions, institutional and policy
frameworks need reform to give due recognition to those benefits, and allow livestock
producers to deliver them unhindered. Various mechanisms are possible for internalising
environmental externalities besides efforts to extend the market, including facilitating
collective action among user groups. Second, where changes in livestock production systems
are required to enhance their potential positive contribution to the environment, or to reduce
their negative impacts, the policy process should be concerned not just with what technical
options should be applied, but also with how technical and institutional reforms are brought
about.
Benefit-sharing among local users
Livestock under grazing and many crop-livestock systems are produced within multiple-use
common property regimes. Insights from the theory of common property regimes tell us that
under the right conditions, collective action among users can internalise environmental
externalities. Consider the ’primary’ function of common property regimes: allocation of a
stream of benefits among multiple users. Customary rationing mechanisms exist in many
pastoral production systems to limit off-take and ensure sustainability, but they are usually
not a question of limiting animal or human numbers, as is often assumed (Swallow 1996).
Instead, rationing takes such forms as rules of entry to or exit from the regime as a whole,
often determined by social norms and codes of conduct; rules governing the use of water
points; opening and closing dates for particular pastures; and rules regarding sound pasture
use (e.g. Mearns 1993, 1996a for Mongolia). Similarly, in Lesotho, the maboella regime
governing the use of common land around villages for grazing, collection of dung, thatching
grass, wild vegetables and medicinal plants by multiple users, has been developed
endogenously to protect trees and other forms of plant cover (Swallow 1996). Such forms of
collective action require extensive and detailed local knowledge.
Common property regimes also provide a range of ’secondary’ functions besides allocation,
including risk management, livelihood security, and the exploitation of economies of scale
and scope in production and collective action (Swallow 1996). In many grazing systems,
cooperative herding arrangements make most efficient use of labour by exploiting economies
of scale in production. Similarly, in crop-livestock systems, integration of livestock and crop
production, rather than simply interaction between the two, exploits economies of scope in
production: it is more efficient to perform them both together7.
                    
7
 See Bayer and Waters-Bayer (1995) and Delgado (1978) for opposing arguments in favour of farmer-herder
interaction owing to other labour-related transaction and opportunity costs.
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Recent research also suggests that there are economies of scope to be gained from collective
action, even where allocation of benefits to livestock production may not be considered the
’primary’ function of the regime (White and Runge 1995, Mearns 1996a). That is, limiting
off-take of conditionally renewable resources may only be one of a number of objects of
collective action. Others may include, for example, processing and marketing of livestock
products, or a wide range of social and ritual activities. Cooperation across a range of
activities exploits economies of scope in collective action, since a minimum basis of ’social
capital’ is required for each to be successful, including trust, and the capacity for endogenous
rule-making and enforcement (Swallow and Bromley 1994). Put simply, the ’social capital’
required for the sustainable and productive management of dynamic and risky environments
would be undermined if it were not for cooperation in livestock production as well as in other
spheres of economic and social life8.
Co-management: benefit-sharing between local and other resource claimants
It is now widely suggested that the theoretical and practical benefits of collective action at the
local level to achieve balance between livestock production and environment can best be
captured within co-management regimes (Swallow and Bromley 1994, Western et al. 1994,
Baland and Platteau 1996). Such regimes aim to forge an effective partnership between the
state and its constituent stakeholders, and the wide variety of potential users of environments
used for livestock production. The state carries overall responsibility for arbitrating
conflicting interests at the national level, and facilitating negotiation between these multiple
stakeholders. But the theoretical arguments above suggest that many practical management
decisions and negotiations among competing users will need to be made at a local level, since
they rely strongly on indigenous knowledge, flexibility in the face of variable and contingent
conditions, and interaction within small groups within which repeated interaction builds
social capital.
Swift (1995) argues for the adoption of the principle of ’subsidiarity’ in the administration of
grazing systems: that some administrative powers currently held by government, and which
duplicate or undermine those governance structures evolved at local level, could be delegated
to local groups, thus lightening the burden on government and leading to more efficient
administration and substantial cost-savings. The delegation of powers to local level would
aim particularly to:
• strengthen customary resource rights (Lane and Moorehead 1995), such as the xeer
system of customary law in Somalia (Said Samantar 1994), or the maboella regime in
Lesotho (Swallow 1991); (see also Box 5 for the case of pasture land leases in Mongolia)
• define a clearer set of procedural tasks for formal law, such as defining the boundaries
within which customary law takes precedence, and providing formal reconciliation and
conflict resolution mechanisms to arbitrate between contested claimants (Swift 1995)
                    
8
 It has been argued elsewhere that success in land reforms in areas of extensive livestock production in  post-
Soviet Central Asia is being hindered by a lack of ’social capital’, or relations of trust and reciprocity among
stakeholders (Mearns 1996b).
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• avoid specifying the actual content of land tenure policy, since the latter would require the
enforcement of fixed territorial boundaries while the necessary degree of flexibility in the
face of risk and uncertainty would require them to be ’fuzzy’ (Behnke 1994)
• compensate for regime failure with respect to benefit-sharing by means of facilitating the
formation of coalitions or federations of pastoral and other groups (Wilson and Thompson
1993). Different functions of multiple use common property regimes have different
implications for group size as well as boundary definition (Swallow 1996, Baland and
Platteau 1996). For example, while the allocation function requires group size to be as
small as economically and technically feasible for the number of resources, uses and users
in question (with preferably fixed boundaries), the risk management function requires
group size to vary from small to large, depending on the level of environmental co-
variation across the landscape (with preferably flexible or ’fuzzy’ boundaries).
Box 5 Pasture land leasing in Mongolia
For co-management arrangements to be successful in arbitrating among contested resource
claims, it is clearly necessary that the full range of potential users be recognised or
anticipated. For example, careful attention to achieving subsidiarity in the interests of pastoral
administration will be of little use if pastoralists’ land claims are superseded by those of
wildlife tourists rather than both being given credence and legitimacy by government. There
are perhaps more documented examples of wildlife being given precedence over pastoralists
than vice versa (e.g. Norton-Griffiths and Southey 1995, McCabe et al. 1992, Brockington
Since 1991 Mongolia has made the transition from a centrally planned to a market-oriented economy. Among the
sweeping legislative reforms is a new land law, which contains various provisions that could stand to benefit pastoral
livestock keepers substantially. Almost half of the Mongolian population are livestock herders, and livestock production
is by far the major form of land use and agricultural output. Livestock and land management strategies are shaped first by
the physical and biological constraints of the varied steppe, mountain and desert environments throughout the country,
which are largely non-equilibrial in character; and second by the institutional frameworks arising from the interaction
between the central political regime of the moment, and the customary institutions of herders themselves.
The new land law allows for land leases of up to 60 years to be issued to groups or to individual herders. These leases are
likely to be taken up for those pastures over which there are more clearly alienable rights, such as winter pastures and
hayfields. Most land will continue to be allocated by local administrations. However, a significant degree of de facto ’co-
management’ already takes place, as local managers broadly recognise the rationality of herders’ own knowledge and
validity of their customary resource claims. The land law specifically recommends that grazing should follow traditional
seasonal movements between pastures, and provides emergency reserve pastures. The land leases could potentially build
on customary institutions based in cooperative herd and labour management at camp and neighbourhood levels. Decision
making is explicitly moving downwards to the local level, and away from centralised bureaucracies as it was under
collectivisation.
The apparent continuities of customary institutions may be deceptive however. Widening income disparities in rural
areas, combined with recent migration of people from towns into rural communities to take up herding but often without
the requisite skills, is leading to an erosion of social capital within herding communities on which collective action in
pasture management depends. The greater tenure security offered by the new land leasing arrangements may be the best
hope for resolving these conflicts in the future.
Sources: Mearns (1993), PALD (1993), Mearns and Swift (1996)
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and Homewood 1996), but opportunities are widely perceived to exist to achieve better
balance between the two.
A major challenge in identifying the share of benefits to be distributed benefit-sharing
mechanisms of this sort is that different users of a given environment may have
fundamentally different views about the relative values of different outputs, about the
appropriate role and number of livestock, and about what the environment should look like.
These issues are inherently value-laden, and cannot be defined objectively. Some views are
bound to have more powerful adherents than others. What can be done through careful
research, however, is to specify a range of scenarios with various combinations of outputs,
from careful analysis of, for example, wildlife-livestock interactions. Each of these scenarios
will necessarily be culturally constructed, and will be undergirded by quite different power
relations, but making them explicit must be the starting point for negotiation over their
relative merits and demerits. This task, however, implies a fundamental shift in the
relationship between research and the policy process.
Integrated Conservation and Development Projects
A now common form of co-management for benefit-sharing between livestock production
and the preservation of wildlife biodiversity is the notion of integrated conservation and
development projects, or ICDPs (Wells and Brandon 1992, Wells 1995, Western et al.1994).
All such projects rest to a greater or lesser extent on the following principles:
• indigenous knowledge is essential for biodiversity conservation (for example, to protect
particular biological communities (e.g. vulnerable wetlands), to protect all individuals of
certain species (e.g. particular fodder tree species), to protect organisms at vulnerable
stages of their lifecycle, and to carry out periodic harvesting as a group activity so as to
monitor populations and harvesting levels effectively)
• local participation. Despite much rhetoric to the contrary, most ICDPs to date have
treated local people as passive beneficiaries of project activities rather than empowering
people to mobilise their own capacities and control the activities that affect their lives
(IIED 1994, Wells 1995, Pimbert and Pretty 1995). Appropriate approaches for effective
participatory inquiry and planning are now well developed, drawing on many long-
established traditions (Chambers 1996, Pretty 1995), and imply a radical departure from
current practice for most development professionals, but they have yet to be applied on a
wide and meaningful scale in operational ICDPs. There is much scope for improvement
on current best practice.
People can only be empowered in aspects of development, including local natural resource
management to meet livelihood entitlements, that do not lead to over-exploitation or
degradation of the protected biodiversity. In practice, this is very difficult to achieve using
economic incentives alone. Project-based approaches have inherent limitations that are often
overlooked. Factors leading to loss of biodiversity include public ownership of extensive
ownership of extensive tracts of land, unmatched by government capacity to manage that land
effectively; powerful financial incentives encouraging resource mining; and laws, policies,
and economic trends over which isolated rural communities have no influence (Wells 1995).
The ’subsidiarity’ or co-management approach rests on adoption as national-level policy, as it
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requires the possibility of change in the institutional and policy environment. This is option is
not possible at the level of individual, often short-term, pilot projects (cf. Toulmin 1991).
Rather than adopt a project-based approach to balancing environmental and livestock benefits
from the environment, many developing countries have adopted policies to encourage
ecotourism. However, limited success has so far been achieved in this regard, owing to:
• lack of analysis of the real economic potential of ecotourism
• failure to capture a greater proportion of ecotourism’s benefits locally and nationally (cf.
Norton-Griffiths and Southey 1995)
• failure to regulate visitor’s adverse environmental and cultural impacts, arising from the
often false perception that total numbers of visitors will yield greater revenues than efforts
to increase fees and charges from a smaller number of visitors (Lindberg 1991)
• failure to provide additional funds for biodiversity conservation
Pastoral associations
The principles of subsidiarity reviewed above imply new roles for pastoral associations.
Following the dismal peformance of ranching and range livestock projects between the 1960s
and the 1980s, the World Bank shifted attention in the 1980s towards pastoral institution-
building (Shanmugaratnam et al. 1992). While these projects were based on broader premises
such as integrated natural resource management, the enabling role of policy and institutional
reforms, and the importance of local participation, they still largely failed to facilitate a
genuinely participatory process of self-development, embedded as they were in the
authoritarian cultures of governments and project administrations (Vedeld, in de Haan 1994).
They still relied heavily on the notion of spatial delineation of rangeland territories, even
though customary land rights were given legal recognition as the subsidiarity principle
suggests.
The implications for future pastoral development initiatives follow from those given above in
relation to subsidiarity: focus attention on procedural law and longer-term political processes,
and the resolution of conflicts, civil security and drought preparedness, rather than attempt to
specify in detail what tenure rights should prevail over what resources. The implications for
groups and for institution-building are to accept that groups of various sizes are likely to
federate together for certain purposes, while separating for others. In all cases, however, the
importance of developing long-term relationships, and beginning from local priorities and
understandings, is paramount.
Financial instruments, public subsidies and investments
Beneficiary-compensation payments  At the international level, the only operational
programme through which contributions could be made to livestock producers to finance the
incremental costs of biodiversity conservation and protection of landscape amenity in
developing countries is the Global Environmental Facility (GEF). The European Union
already operates a similar financial mechanism for achieving benefit-sharing between farmers
and the environment. Although as Norton-Griffiths and Southey (1995) note, the GEF was
not designed with situations such as the one described here in mind, there is no reason in
principle why it could not be used to finance such activities, provided a reasoned case could
be made for the advantages of recognising and further developing the role of livestock
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producer groups in biodiversity conservation. There is a need for further research in this
respect, to specify clearly the nature of interactions between livestock produced under
existing conditions in areas of high amenity or conservation value, to identify the range of
options available for ensuring the most beneficial forms of benefit-sharing, and to provide
costed proposals for any new incremental activities to be undertaken by livestock producers.
Taxation  Livestock production in variable environments should not be taxed as though it had
a stable and regular set of outputs. Taxation systems currently in use tend to have perverse
environmental and equity implications for benefit-sharing of environmental goods and
services. Head taxes on animals, for example, common in West Africa, would be fair and
efficient if applied progressively (i.e. higher head tax on larger herd sizes), but this rarely
happens and would be costly to collect. Sales taxes may disproportionately affect small
herders who usually sell a larger proportion of their animals, and would be especially
burdensome in drought years when all herders well more animals (Swift 1995). Grazing fees
discriminate against small herders. The important thing in dynamic environments is that
whatever taxation system is chosen, it is applied flexibly, and that a moratorium on taxation is
declared in the event of drought. Efforts to specify more comprehensively the total economic
value of livestock production should provide a sound basis on which to reinvest tax revenues
in livestock production systems, and could form an additional source of revenue for financing
the incremental costs of establishing effective co-management arrangements.
Other instruments are discussed in the literature as means to enable pastoralists and other
livestock producers to cope better with environmental risk and uncertainty, including
insurance and credit (Swift 1995), measures for rapid destocking and restocking, according to
particular phases in the drought cycle (Toulmin 1995), and investments in marketing,
transport and communications infrastructure to facilitate rapid off-take when necessary
(Holtzman and Kulibaba 1995). All such measures would help support the conservation
potential of dryland grazing systems. Rapid destocking (at supported prices) during the onset
of drought, for example, would help protect forage for wildlife in the short term.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations are among those of highest priority for inclusion in action
plans and pilot activities, to accentuate the positive in livestock-environment interactions, and
to build on new understanding and the limited successes achieved to date. First, two cross-
cutting themes or general principles are reviewed. These are followed by a summary of the
kinds of instruments and mechanisms recommended for bringing about closer benefit-sharing
of particular environmental goods and services.
Inform decision-making
The ’new’ thinking in range ecology suggests an urgent need for training of a new generation
of range managers able to combine technical insight with socio-economic analysis. They need
to have the ability to focus of the needs of multiple, competing users; facilitate participatory
planning processes; and negotiate during conflicts, among many other technical skills
(Scoones 1996). For example, the quest for a simple carrying capacity number is inadequate
for non-equilibrium, or even intermittent equilibrium, rangelands. A more sophisticated
approach based on risk analysis for forage demand and supply is required, but one which does
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not aim to produce a rigid scientific assessment appropriate for all producers for all time
(ibid.), but instead accepts that stocking strategies and management practices will vary
according to a multiplicity of desired outputs and environmental/ amenity services. While
vested interests and powerful constituencies will continue to oppose change, the persistence
of outmoded concepts and ways of working are likely to frustrate attempts to balance
livestock production and environmental goods and services unless training curricula are
radically altered in agricultural colleges and universities throughout the world (cf. Leach and
Mearns 1996).
’Democratise expertise’
Many of the instruments and mechanisms for achieving benefit sharing of environmental
goods and services discussed in this paper call for new forms of professionalism among
government officials and others responsible for implementing policies, programmes and
projects (cf. Chambers 1996, Pimbert and Pretty 1995). There is a fundamental need to re-
cast the relationship between ’research’ and ’policy-making’, in order to make explicit the
’plural rationalities’ of all stakeholders (Thompson 1993, Leach and Mearns 1996). Much is
now known about how to facilitate a genuinely participatory development process, but this
urgently needs operational application.
These two general principles underlie all of the technical and institutional options for
bringing about benefit sharing of environmental goods and services between livestock
producers and other resource claimants. Where changes are required to enhance the potential
positive contribution of livestock to the environment, or to reduce their negative impacts, the
policy process should be less concerned with what technical options should be applied than
with how technical and institutional reforms should be brought about.
Table 3 summarises the recommendations made in this paper for bringing about closer
benefit-sharing of environmental goods and services in livestock production. Following the
analytical frame adopted in section 1, this distinguishes the environmental goods and services
provided under various forms of livestock production by the nature of their contribution to
total economic value: ecological function values, direct use values, and option values. Six
potential types of mechanism for bringing about closer benefit-sharing are considered:
benefit-sharing among local users (facilitating collective action); benefit-sharing between
local and other users (co-management mechanisms, or ’subsidiarity’); beneficiary-
compensation payments; taxation; infrastructure development; and technology options. Some
examples of specific instruments or mechanisms are described below, following this
typology.
Benefit-sharing among local users: facilitating collective action
• at the local level, mechanisms are required for negotiating and resolving conflicts
between competing resource claimants. These should focus on procedural law, rather than
specifying in normative terms who ought to have access to what resources and when.
Such mechanisms will enhance the potential role of mobile livestock production in
sustaining rangelands. They are also likely to enhance the potential for carbon
sequestration under livestock production, to the extent that conflicts between farmers
and herders may be resolved; and for bringing about effective nutrient cycling, for
example by means of manuring contracts between farmers and herders. At an operational
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level, this means understanding in detail the multiple functions of institutional
arrangements facilitating land management
Benefit-sharing between local and other resource claimants: co-management or
’subsidiarity’
• many contested resource claims cannot be resolved at the local level but need to be
addressed at a higher level of administration. Co-management is limited in its potential if
it addressed only through projects. Rather, it needs to focus on policy mechanisms such as
secure yet flexible land rights for pastoralists for sustaining rangelands. Other means to
empower pastoral and other institutions can only be devised with a detailed understanding
of the multiple functions of such institutions. Preservation of wildlife and other forms of
biodiversity will only be achieved if transfers are made between those who benefit from
conservation and improved landscape amenity at national and international levels, and
livestock producers in situ. Such transfers may take the form of beneficiary-
compensation payments (e.g. compensating livestock producers for income forgone
through extensification).
• other examples of beneficiary-compensation payments that build on principles of co-
management could include subsidies from CGIAR and other international organisations
working to develop animal genetic resources, to national research institutions in
developing countries that are developing breeds well-adapted to low-resource
environments but which do not currently receive international credit for doing so.
Taxation and infrastructure
• instruments of taxation can also help in sustaining rangeland management and in
preserving wildlife and other forms of biodiversity if they reward livestock producers for
maintaining moderate rather than high stocking rates. Graduated head taxes are one such
form of progressive taxation. Infrastructure development can support such objectives, for
example in facilitating rapid offtake of animals at supported prices during the onset of
drought in dryland environments. Specific measures should address development of
communications to inform producers of likely changes in rainfall and livestock prices;
and transport and marketing infrastructure to help them sell animals quickly. All such
measures contribute to maintaining stocking levels appropriate to prevailing conditions of
forage availability.
Technologies to enhance natural resources
• various technology options are known for enhancing natural resources in low-resource
areas in ways that increase biomass cover, and hence contribute to nutrient cycling,
carbon sequestration, and household energy supply. These need to be encouraged in
ways compatible with the livelihood ans risk-management concerns of livestock
producers. Such options include deferred grazing schemes, planting of perennial fodder
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crops, introduction of stall feeding, and better integration of trees and shrubs into farming
systems.
Table 1.  World livestock totals and species diversity
Animal Total number
1994 (’000)
Change since
1982-84 (%)
Total number of
known domestic
species
Number of
known breeds
cattle & yak
sheep
pigs
goats
buffalo
equines
camelids
chickens
  1,288,124
  1,086,661
     869,872
     609,488
     148,798
     116,882
       18,831
12,002,000
  3
  6
12
  6
13
  5
13
48
  4
  6
10
  9
  4
  9
  2
n.a.
783
863
263
313
  62
435
n.a.
n.a.
Sources: For livestock production totals, FAO Agricultural Production Yearbook (1994); for information on
species diversity, World Conservation Monitoring Centre (1994), Biodiversity Data Sourcebook
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Table 2.  Comparisons between ranching and pastoral production systems in Africa
Country Comments Sources
Zimbabwe All studies show that the value of communal area (CA) cattle
production far exceeds returns from ranching. If actual
stocking rates are used, CA returns are ten times higher per
hectare.
Danckwerts (1974)
Jackson (1989)
Barrett (1992)
Scoones (1992a)
Botswana Communal area production (in cash, energy and protein terms)
per hectare exceeds by at least three times per hectare returns
from ranches, even though technical production parameters are
lower. The difference in soil erosion levels between the two
production systems is negligible, despite differences in
stocking rate.
Rennie et al. (1977)
Carl Bro (1982)
Hubbard (1982)
De Ridder and Wagenaar
(1984)
Abel (1993)
Mozambique Traditional systems have higher overall returns per hectare
because of the multiple benefits of draft, transport, manure,
milk and meat compared to the single beef output from
ranches.
Rocha et al. (1991)
South Africa Cattle production systems in the Transkei show higher returns
per hectare, but lower productivity indicators, compared to
ranches in the commercial white farming sector.
Tapson (1991, 1993)
Richardson (1992)
Kenya Gross output levels in individual ranches and undeveloped
group ranches are comparable.  Similarly high levels of
productivity were found among livestock in Sukumaland.
De Leeuw et al. (1984)
Bekure et al. (1991)
Western (1982)
Tanzania The productivity of pastoral herds in the Ngorongoro
Conservation Area were found to be comparable to
commercial herds. The patterns of productivity were similar to
those found in Kenyan Maasai herds.  Maasai multi-product
outputs are higher than ranches on a per hectare basis.
Birley (1982)
Homewood and Rodgers
(1991)
Homewood (1992)
Uganda Recalculations of figures to include full range of costs and
benefits show that dollar returns per hectare under pastoralism
are two times higher than for ranching. Dollar returns per
animal are a third higher.
Ruthenberg (1980)
Behnke (1985a)
Ethiopia The pastoral Borana system has higher returns of both energy
and protein per hectare compared to industrialised ranching
systems in Australia. Australian Northern Territory ranches
only realise 16% of the energy and 30% of the protein per
hectare compared to the Borana system.
Cossins (1985)
Upton (1989)
Cossins and Upton  (1988)
Mali Transhumant pastoral systems yield on average at least two
times the amount of protein per hectare per year compared to
both sedentary agropastoralists and ranchers in the US and
Australia.
Breman and de Wit (1983)
Wilson et al. (1983)
Source:  Scoones (1995: 12)
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Table 3.  Summary of potential instruments and mechanisms for benefit-sharing of environmental goods and services
Environmental goods and services
suitable for benefit-sharing
Benefit-sharing
among local
users:
facilitating
collective
action
Benefit-sharing
between users
at different
levels: co-
management or
’subsidiarity’
Beneficiary-
compensation
payments
Taxation Infrastructure Technology
Ecological function values:
• sustainable rangeland management ä ä ä ä
• preservation of wildlife biodiversity ä ä ä ä
• soil fertility enhancement/ nutrient
cycling ä ä ä
• carbon sequestration ä ä ä
Direct use values:
• landscape amenity ä ä
• draught animal power ä
• household energy supply ä
Option values:
• animal genetic resources ä ä
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